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1. Introduction 
The government through Oslo municipality devotes a reasonable amount of resources to 
redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. In an attempt to reach this redistributive 
goal, Oslo municipality uses a number of economic instruments to help those in economic 
difficulties. Two of these instruments are social help and the so called economic housing 
instruments (økonomiske boligvirkemidler) which include among others, rent allowance 
(bostøtte) and Husbanken’s loaning systems. Rent allowance sums up to annual payments of 
500 million kroner, and Husbanken loans out up to 700 million kroner each year, and over 
900 million kroner was given out in social help to individuals in Oslo municipality in 2005, 
with about 25% given to individuals with foreign background. 
1.1 Redistributive potential of transfers 
Redistribution has a utilitarian motive and seeks to reduce the poverty gap in the society. That 
the poor in the society need help is an indication that the society admits that these people’s 
situation is caused by circumstances outside their control, and that they themselves cannot 
change the situation. This is the case that most welfare policies and literature on welfare 
discuss (Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), and many more). An important issue raised in 
these papers is how to reduce the deadweight loss caused by over consumption of welfare 
goods and services. This over consumption is caused by individuals consuming goods and 
services that they do not qualify for. Recent development in welfare policies and literature has 
also turned its focus to the dynamic aspect of the issue, where through poverty alleviation 
programs, individuals (if possible) are in the long run helped to get over the poverty line. 
Most of this literature focuses on helping these individuals to get into the labour market or to 
be able to earn their own incomes through businesses. These discussions focus on how efforts 
made by individuals in one period, may affect their probability of getting into the labour 
market in another period. In such cases, as Besley and Coate (1992) put it, poverty is not only 
caused by bad luck, but also by individual decisions. The long-run dependence on social 
welfare in Norway is a problem that affects individuals who for certain reasons either cannot 
get into the labour market for the first time, or return to it after a fall out. The inability to work 
is mainly caused by health conditions and/or lack of relevant qualifications. However, when 
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discussing immigrant employment in Norway, Bratsberg, Raaum and Røed (2006) argue that 
besides lack of relevant skills, discrimination and disutility of labour in the form of cultural 
preferences, may also explain the low participation of immigrants in the labour market. The 
long-run dependence on welfare assistance has especially been a topic of discussion on issues 
concerning immigrants and integration. Statistics show that on average immigrants, especially 
those with non-western background, depend on welfare assistance more frequently and over 
longer periods than the population in general. Generally, integration into the labour market 
has been extended to address integration into the social system, where when addressing 
immigrant issues and politics, labour exclusion, poverty and social exclusion have been 
addressed by similar policy instruments. The latest development has been the bringing 
together of the welfare offices (trygdekontor og sosialkontor) and labour office (Aetat) in an 
attempt to improve the services offered to the users. 
Many arguments have been brought up in order to reduce the deadweight loss that is caused 
by this over consumption. Literature on welfare points out that when the policy makers do not 
have the information necessary to target the deserving recipients, then it should devise “self-
targeting” mechanisms that induce only the intended recipients to participate with the others 
opting out (Gahvari and de Mattos (2004)). This is in line with John Mill (1848)’s 
characterization of poverty alleviation problem as how to give help to those who need it 
without unduly encouraging their reliance on it. One way to achieve this is by imposing 
certain restrictions on the participants, so that those who are not targeted do not find it 
beneficial to participate in these programs.  See, among others, Nichols and Zeckhauser 
(1982), Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), and Besley and Coate (1991, 1992). These 
restrictions make the welfare gains less attractive and are used to screen or deter individuals 
from applying for transfers that they do not deserve. The screening argument is motivated by 
the desire to discourage the potential impostors from applying for welfare transfers, and 
thereby only the truly needy benefiting from the welfare assistance. The deterrent argument is 
according to Besley and Coate (1992) and is motivated by the idea that individual choices in 
the present period affect their state in a future state. The goal therefore is to induce all agents 
to exert their correct level of effort in all periods, so that those who can get and keep out of 
poverty. I will in this thesis discuss some of these arguments and compare them to the welfare 
system in Oslo.  
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Individuals consume some amounts of consumption goods and leisure, and they have different 
preferences over different bundles of these goods. They have a labour income which they use 
to purchase some consumption goods. This labour income is earned by working a number of 
hours. This implies that there is a trade-off between the consumption good and the amount of 
leisure an individual can have. For a given numbers of hours worked, there are individuals 
with high income generating ability who earn higher than those with low income generating 
ability. There may also be individuals who have higher consumption costs than their income, 
so that although they have high income generating ability, they may still need economic 
transfers to cover their consumption costs. The government’s objective then is to provide 
some transfers to those with low income and those with high consumption costs, so that they 
can afford consumption goods enough to sustain themselves. These transfers are in the form 
of cash- and in-kind-transfers. 
An entry point to my discussion is to use a discrete choice model, where each individual 
chooses whether to apply for transfers, or not. The use of taxes to redistribute wealth and 
income is the most discussed instrument both in the society and in the economic literature. 
Many studies show that when there is a discrete choice between some goods then transfers 
may lead to redistribution. Besley and Coate (1991) do this when discussing public provision 
of private goods. In this thesis I will discuss a situation where the government taxes those 
with high income generating ability and those who do not have higher consumption costs than 
their income, and provides transfers to those with low income generating ability and those 
with higher consumption costs than their income, besides providing other welfare services. 
 
I will in the next chapter discuss individual’s labour-leisure choice given preferences and 
endowments, but without transfers. Then I will discuss the effect of transfers and specifically 
consider the non-distorting effects of lump-sum taxes. These discussions are held under the 
assumption that the government has full information about the individuals’ income generating 
ability (here given by their wage levels) and preferences. 
 
In reality, however, the government makes its decisions in an environment of asymmetric 
information, and in addition, cannot use lump-sum taxes to redistribute income. This causes a 
deadweight loss which the government must try to reduce in order to achieve its redistributive 
goal. I will in chapters 3, 4 and 5 discuss how restrictions on the recipients can be used to 
reduce this deadweight loss caused by imperfect information, and argue that as long as the 
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loss that these restrictions cause is less than their total gain, then their use can help reach the 
utilitarian objective of the government. The gains can be in the form of reduced poverty gap 
through redistribution of income, and/or an increase in labour skills, which may increase 
individuals’ chances of getting into the labour market, thus reducing the number of the poor. 
How exactly to measure these losses and gains will not, however, be discussed in this thesis. I 
have in chapter 3, discussed the use of restrictions such as work requirement and reduced 
cash-transfers, and in chapter 4, the use of in-kind transfers to target the recipients. These 
discussions are based on a static model, which I move from in chapter 5 and look at how work 
requirement can be used in a dynamic set up to deter individuals from depending on welfare 
programs over long periods. In chapter 6, I compare the welfare programs of Oslo 
municipality to some of the instruments discussed in this thesis. The conclusion shall be 
presented in chapter 7. 
 
 
  
5 
2. Individuals’ labour-leisure choice given preferences 
and endowments 
Assume an economy with N individuals who each lives for only one period. A representative 
individual has a labour income w , which he spends on a consumption good c , at price p. This 
consumption good is an aggregate of the individual’s expenditure and includes expenditure on 
food, clothes and housing, among others. We assume that this individual has no other source 
of income, and in our one period model he has no reason to save anything. The individual has 
a given endowment of time which he can either use at work or for leisure. He exerts some 
level of effort e, measured in the amount of labour hours, in order to generate some income 
which is used to buy the consumption good. Leisure time costs in the form of consumption 
goods foregone. By normalising the endowed amount of time to 1, we get le 1 . The 
representative individual has preferences over consumption and leisure given by the utility 
function, ),( lcu . In our model ),( lcu  is increasing in each argument, strictly concave and 
twice differentiable.   
 
2.1 Optimization 
 
If the individuals take prices as given, then their decisions depend only on relative prices, so 
that we can treat one good as the numeraire and set its price to 1. I will follow the convention 
here, and treat the consumption good as the numeraire and set 1p  . The price of leisure in 
units of consumption is w.  
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2.1.1 The individual’s problem 
 
Each individual treats w as fixed and maximizes his utility subject his constraints, that is, each 
solves 
 
)3.2(0
)2.2(10
)1.2(
),(max
,
c
l
wwlc
tosubject
lcu
lc
 
 
Equation (2.1) is the budget constraint and states that the total amount spent on consumption 
good plus that spent on leisure, must equal the total income earned through labour. Here 
labour is the only source of income. (2.2) states that leisure must be positive, and not exceed 
the total amount of time the individual is endowed with, and (2.3) is a non negativity 
constraint on consumption. 
Given that 0),(
' lcuc , then the budget constraint will hold with equality. ),(
' lcui  is the 
partial derivative of ),( lcu  with respect to argument lci , . We also assume that 
0;),(lim,0;),(lim '
0
'
0
clcuandllcu l
l
c
c
, this will ensure that the non negativity 
constraints on consumption and leisure will not be binding, and that in equilibrium, we will 
therefore never have 1l  because this would imply that 0e , and 0c , which wouldn’t 
support existence. We can therefore ignore this case. We further assume that ),( lcu is quasi-
concave in both arguments. 
 
The optimization problem is now simplified to 
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The Langragian for the problem is 
)(),( cwlwlcuL , 
where  is the Langragian multiplier. The restrictions on the utility function ensure that there 
is a unique optimum which is characterized by the following first order conditions: 
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(2.4) and (2.5) give us; 
w
lcu
lcu lc
),(
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'
' , which can be written as w
lcu
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c
l
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'
'
 and states that 
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS hereafter) of leisure for consumption equals the wage 
rate, or in other words; the amount of consumption goods the individual is willing to give up 
in order to get one more unit of leisure of equals the wage rate. 
 
From (2.1) we get wlc
dl
dc
)(' , which gives us the opportunity costs of leisure in terms of 
consumption good. We see that an extra unit of leisure will cost the individual w units of 
forgone consumption goods. –w is the slope of the curve we get when we rewrite the budget 
constraint by expressing consumption as a function of leisure, that is )1( lwc . 
 
The MRS measures the value that the individual places on one extra unit of leisure relative to 
that of consumption goods, whereas the opportunity cost is quantified by amount of consumer 
good he has to sacrifice. We see that 
),(
),(
'
'
lcu
lcu
dl
dc
c
l which implies that when the individuals 
maximize their utility then their marginal rate of substitution equals their opportunity cost. 
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For a given wage level, the individual can increase his consumption by working more. The 
budget constraint makes it impossible to increase both consumption and leisure given that the 
wage rate remains unchanged. Different bundles of consumption good and leisure may give 
different levels of utility. 
 
For given utility function and wage rate, the individual’s optimal allocation is given by 
),('
),('
lcu
lcu
dl
dc
c
l . This is shown in figure 2.1 by the point where the budget curves tangents the 
utility curve. For any *ll  on the budget constraint, the individual can increase his utility by 
increasing his amount of leisure. And for any *ll  on the budget constraint, the individual 
can increase his utility by reducing his amount of leisure. For given utility function and wage 
rate, the individual cannot use his labour inputs to raise his utility to any level above the point 
where 
),('
),('
lcu
lcu
dl
dc
c
l . That is why we say that this allocation is optimal. 
c 
 Figure 2.1 
 )1( lwc  
),( lcu  
l 
l* 
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2.2 Endogenous labour supply 
 
Our representative individual allocates his time between activities in the economic market 
(labour) and all other activities (leisure), 1le , and earns wages w for each labour hour 
which he spends on the consumption good c. This implies that he can afford we  amount of 
the consumption good for working e hours, and we get )1( lwwec  which can also be 
written as 
)6.2(1
w
c
l  
Note that (2.6) can also be derived from the budget constraint (2.1). 
 
2.2.1 The effects of wage level on labour-leisure choice  
 
The intra-temporal substitution effect: Substitution effect is the effect where a price change 
affects the slope of the budget constraint, but leaves the consumer on the same indifference 
curve. This effect causes the consumer to substitute away from the good that becomes 
comparatively more expensive. Suppose now that there is an increase in the wage rate. Higher 
wages make labour more productive which effectively increases the opportunity costs of 
leisure; the individual may thus choose to stay at the same level of utility and substitute 
leisure for the labour. He therefore works more. An increase in the number of hours worked 
increases the amount of consumption goods affordable. 
 
The intra-temporal income effect: Higher wages means more income for the same amount of 
labour input; hence the individual may find it optimal to maximise his utility by increasing 
both consumption and leisure. An increase in income (caused by increase in w) shifts the new 
budget constraint upwards, and thus the individual can achieve a higher utility level. An 
increase in wage rates here leads to an increase in both the amount of consumption goods 
leisure consumed by the individual, and the individual increases his utility. 
 
A positive change in wages will therefore lead to a positive change in consumption through 
both the intra-temporal substitution effect and the income effect. The change in leisure, 
however, depends on whether the substitution or income effect is dominant. A greater 
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increase in c relative to that of w, leads to the substitution effect being dominant since 
w
c
 in 
(2.6) increases and l decreases. If c increases relatively less than w, so that 
w
c
 decreases, and l 
increases, then the income effect is dominant. If the substitution effect dominates over the 
income effect, then an increase in wages leads to a decrease in leisure. If the income effect 
dominates over the substitution effect, then an increase in wages leads to an increase in 
leisure. If the two effects are equal, then labour leisure choice is not affected by the wage 
level.  
  
Figure 2.2 illustrates a case where an increase in the wage level leads to an increase in both 
the consumption good and leisure, but the increase in leisure is almost negligible. 
 
c 
 Figure 2.2 
 )1(1 lwc  
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l *
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*
0c  
*
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2.3 Diversity in wage rates 
 
In reality, different individuals earn different amounts of hourly wages depending on their 
qualifications, working experience, and sector of labour. For simplicity, let our economy have 
two individuals, one with a low hourly wage rate w , and another with a higher hourly wage 
rate w . From (2.1) we get )1( lwc , which expresses consumption as a function of leisure. 
Figure 2.3 shows the adjustment of the amount of consumption good for given values of w 
and l. 
 
 
 
 
For any amount of leisure, the individual with the lower wage rate earns less than the one with 
higher wage rate. The relation between wage rate and effort also reflects the opportunity costs 
of leisure. Consumption goods are more costly for the individual with low wage rate than the 
individual with high wage rate, which gives difference in levels of utility reached for any 
given amount of leisure. In our two individuals’ economy, we define the poor as the 
individual who for any level of effort, has lower income level. This individual has a low 
income generating ability represented here by w . From figure 2.3, we can also see that this 
individual has a lower amount of leisure time for any level of consumption good. Assuming 
that both individuals have the same preference over given bundles of consumption goods and 
c 
l 
 ),( lcu  
Figure 2.3 
c  
1 
c  
 )1( lwc  
 )1( lwc  
 ),( lcu  
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leisure, then the individual with low income generating ability has lower utility of 
consumption goods and leisure for any given effort level or amount of consumption good. I 
will in the next section define the individual with low income generating ability as poor and 
the one with high income generating ability as rich. 
 
In the discussion above, the ability is in the form of income generating ability which gives 
different wage levels. Individuals may for health reasons, however, have high disutility of 
labour and thereby be forced to reduce their labour hours, which would affect how much 
labour income they get in total. In such a case, we may refer to the individual with high 
disutility of labour as poor. Another group that may be categorised as poor are those with high 
relative utility of income. For them it is so that for any level of income, they have relatively 
higher consumptions expenses than others of the same income and income generating ability. 
These consumptions costs could be due to size of the family, medical treatment, special 
housing, or transport situation. This forms the backdrop for my discussion, where individuals 
are either poor or rich, and there is a benevolent policy maker whose goal is to tax the rich 
and offer some transfers to the poor. In my simplified model with only two individuals, I will 
consider one poor and another rich, or one with low ability and the other high ability. 
 
2.4 Use of social assistance 
 
If we assume that each individual only has his labour income as his source of income, then for 
any given level of consumption, the individual provides l1  amount of labour, given the 
budget constraint and the fact that 10 l  . Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that says that 
the moral worth of an action is determined solely by its contribution to overall utility. The 
government’s redistributive objective is based on this theory, and can here be captured by 
supposing that it offers some economic transfer to the low ability individual so as to increase 
his utility. Given that we have two types of individuals (one with low ability and the other 
with high ability) the government’s intervention is such that it gives transfers to the low 
ability individuals, while preserving the incentives of the one with high ability to make 
choices that will put him in a position to work and pay taxes to cover the transfers to the low 
ability individual. 
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The welfare system works in a way such that the low income individual receives an economic 
transfer equal to A, while the high income individual pays taxes to cover this transfer. In this 
benchmark case, I assume that there is full information and the government can observe the 
individuals’ earning abilities and preferences. Besley and Coate (1992) examine a similar 
situation when presenting a benchmark case for discussing the use of poverty alleviation 
programs. In addition to assuming full information, the authors also assume that each 
individual has quasi-linear preferences defined over income and work. This corresponds to 
my utility function, ),( lcu where el 1  as defined before. 
 
I will in the next section show that lump-sum transfers in the form of social help are efficient, 
in that they do not distort the Pareto optimum allocations of labour and leisure. 
 
  
2.4.1 The non-distorting effect of lump-sum transfers 
Lump-sum tax, is a tax where each individual pays a fixed amount independent of the level of 
his or her income. The amount each individual pays may vary, given his ability (in order to 
generate redistribution), but does not vary with how much effort he exerts. Economic 
literature generally supports the fact that this kind of taxes is the most suitable instrument to 
use, since it does not distort the labour leisure choice (Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), 
Kevin Roberts (1984), Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982), Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)). This 
is to say that when lump-sum taxes is used, then the Samuelson condition that MRS = MRT, 
or opportunity costs as in our case, is met and the individuals do not wish to change their 
labour-leisure allocations. 
To set up a benchmark case for further analysis of welfare instruments, I will here consider 
the use of optimal lump-sum transfers, assuming that the policy makers have full information 
about the potential applicants’ preferences and wage rates. For any amount of hours worked, 
the low ability individual now gets his labour income )1( lw  plus some welfare 
endowment A , which is in the form of lump-sum transfers. The high ability individual, on the 
other hand, has a labour income )1( lw  and pays a lump-sum tax A to cover the transfers to 
the low ability individual. Each individual chooses freely on what to spend his after 
transfer/tax income. The preference over consumption and labour has not changed and the 
utility function, ),( lcu i where cci  or cci  still fulfils the same conditions as before. 
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The poor individual’s problem now is  
)7.2(
),(max
,
Awwlc
tosubject
lcu
lc
 
 
(2.7) is the new budget constraint. Total income now is labour income plus the welfare 
endowment, and this equals the total amount spent on consumption good plus that spent on 
leisure. 
 
The Langragian for the problem is 
 
)(),( cwlAwlcuL , 
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(2.8) and (2.9) give us w
lcu
lcu
c
l
),(
),(
'
'
 and as before we find that the marginal rate of substitution 
of leisure for consumption equals the wage rate. 
 
From (2.7) we get wlc
dl
dc
)(' , and again as above, we find that
),(
),(
'
'
lcu
lcu
dl
dc
c
l  which 
implies that individuals maximize their utility when their marginal rate of substitution equals 
their opportunity cost. We see that the individuals’ utilities are maximised when MRS equals 
opportunity costs, exactly like in the case when labour income was the only source of income. 
This implies that the lump-sum transfers do not distort the optimal allocation of labour and 
leisure. That the low ability individuals can now work less for the same amount of total 
income is an intended distributive objective of the transfers. The high ability individual now 
allocates his labour-leisure choice to a point where his MRS equals his opportunity costs 
given the lump-sum taxes he has to pay, and ends up at ** ,cl  as illustrated in figure 2.4. The 
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low ability individual maximises his utility given now his wage rate and the transfers he is 
legible to, and ends up at 
**
,cl  as illustrated in figure 2.5. These points give Pareto optimal 
allocations in that no individual can be made better off without making the other worse off. 
Lump-sum transfers, we can therefore say, move the allocations from one Pareto optimal to 
another. 
 
In the case above the use lump-sum transfers and given perfect information makes it 
straightforward for the government to devise a separating scheme, so that only to those who 
are eligible benefited from the transfers. It has the information of each individual’s income 
generating ability and preference, and imposes some lump-sum taxes on those with high 
ability , and gives lump-sum transfers to those with low ability. If Y is the after-transfer taxes 
for the individuals, then such a policy will give an individual with a wage level, w an income 
profile defined by 
)10.2(
)1(
)1(
wwifAlw
wwifAlw
Y . 
Individuals with different levels of ability, will now face new budgets line shown by the bold 
lines in figure 2.4  and 2.5. 
 
 
 
 
y 
l 
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Figure 2.4 
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In reality, the government makes its decisions in an environment of asymmetric information 
(and not the one with full information as assumed in the discussions above), which makes the 
application of lump-sum transfers impossible. Most economic discussions, therefore, 
concentrate on the measures available which can be used to more efficiently reach the 
government’s redistributive goal. The assumption that all individuals have the similar 
preference over similar bundles of consumption goods and leisure is also not met in reality. 
These deviations from the assumptions of full information, and those under which lump-sum 
tax was discussed lead to different results, and in particular cause deadweight loss (Harris and 
Townsend (1981), Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982)). The government cannot therefore achieve 
the Pareto optimal allocation, and must take its environmental conditions into account when 
designing its transfer schemes. The transfer schemes achieved when not all optimal conditions 
are met are referred to as second-best Pareto optimal schemes. This is in comparison to the 
first-best Pareto optimal schemes that can be achieved under full information. 
 
 
y 
l 
 AlwY )1(  
Figure 2.5 
 )1( lw  
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2.5 Deterring individuals from diverging from their optimal 
allocation, designing separating schemes 
 
A situation where the government or the policy maker is unable to observe individuals’ 
ability, wage level, or preference, makes it impossible for it to design a first-best transfer 
schedules.  It must instead resort to second best transfer schedules based on the indicators it 
has, and target efficiency among individuals, so that those who are not eligible do not gain 
from claiming the transfers. The process where the government makes the first move, in order 
to get the right information from the applicants, and thereby discouraging the potential 
impostors from applying for transfers, is called screening. 
 
In the dynamic set-up, Besley and Coate (1992) introduce the concept of deterrence which 
they discuss through the application of work requirement. Under work requirement, recipients 
have to meet certain participation requirements in order to receive welfare benefits. These 
requirements are often a combination of activities that are intended to improve the recipient's 
employment prospects (such as training, rehabilitation and work experience) and those 
designated as contributing to society (such as unpaid or underpaid work). We can therefore 
refer to work requirement, as welfare with restrictions. According to Besley and Coate (1992), 
the deterrence argument of work requirement enables us to capture the idea that poverty 
depends not only on luck, but also on choices made earlier in life. We therefore see how 
individuals’ ex ante choices influence their future earning ability. In an asymmetric 
information set up, we will see that restrictions may serve as incentives for those who do not 
qualify not to apply for transfers. Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) argue that an optimal 
transfer program in general may have to sacrifice productive efficiency in order to target 
recipient efficiency, and suggest that one way of doing this is by imposing restrictions on 
recipients. Other restrictions include; reducing minimum income that qualifies one to receive 
transfers, using more efforts to ensure that the information given is correct, the latter may, 
however, not be achieved in practice. Restrictions on consumption bundles through in-kind 
transfers and giving some information rent, can also be used to induce individuals to reveal 
their true income generating ability. We will see when discussing these restrictions, that the 
government must sacrifice some efficient allocation in order to target efficiency among the 
individuals. I will argue that the allocations achieved through restrictions on beneficiaries, 
however, improve the performance of the programs. This is the same as the finding by 
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Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), who concluded that by imposing restrictions on beneficiaries, 
programs will perform better than those that rely solely on income taxes and (cash) transfers. 
 
In reality and as assumed in this paper, there are high ability individuals who for a reasonable 
tax level will prefer exerting their optimal effort level and pay taxes, to working less or not 
working at all, and claiming transfers. There are also low ability individuals who are eligible 
to receive transfers. These two groups do not add any problems to the government’s decision 
making. There are, however, those individuals who by reducing their labour input and 
applying for transfers, may get a higher utility than the one they would get from working the 
optimal amount of hours, and depending only on their labour income. If not addressed by the 
transfer schemes in an asymmetric information environment, then these individuals may claim 
transfers that they do not qualify for, and lead to higher costs for the governments, thus 
undermining its redistributive objectives.  
 
I will in the next sections discuss how, by using different restrictions, the government can 
design separating schemes where individuals exert their optimal level of effort and only those 
truly deserving benefit from transfers. 
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3 Imperfect information: 
 Poverty caused by income generating ability 
 
Consider a situation where poverty is caused by the ability to generate income, with the low 
ability individual referred to as poor and the high ability individual, rich. As discussed in the 
previous section, for any given tax/transfer level there will be three types; those who will 
work and pay taxes, those who may pretend to be of low ability and apply for transfers, and 
those who truly deserve transfers. But also as mentioned there, the problem with asymmetric 
information set-up is that of separating the potential impostors from the truly deserving 
applicants. It is these two groups which the individuals I discuss in this thesis, represent. 
 
)1( le  implies that each individual’s preference can be expressed as a function of the 
consumption good and effort. The low ability individual receives low hourly wages w , which 
for a given number of labour hours gives him some low labour income denoted by )1( lw . 
The high ability individual, on the other hand, receives high hourly wages w , which for a 
given number of labour hours gives him some high income denoted by )1( lw . The 
redistributive objective of the government is to give the low ability individual some transfer 
A, so that he can end up at a utility level higher than the one he would have if he only had his 
labour income. This can, for example, be achieved when A is such that for any number of 
hours, he can get more units of the consumption good. This increases the low ability 
individual’s utility of the consumption good and leisure. The high ability individual, on his 
side, pays taxes to cover the transfers, a condition that reduces his utility of the consumption 
good and leisure. We assume that w  and w  are known, but the government cannot observe 
what type each individual is. Consumption equals total income, which equals labour income 
plus transfers, that is Alwyc )1( .  
 
An optimal transfer scheme should be such that the high ability individual pays taxes to cover 
the transfers to the low ability individual. For such a scheme to be implemented, however, it 
must be incentive-compatible, that is, the high ability(low ability) individual must prefer his 
tax (transfer) package to the one he gets by pretending to be of low ability (high ability). In 
such case the high ability individual works )1( *l hours, earns *y , and pays taxes, AT . 
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The low ability individual works )1(
*
l hours which gives 
*
y in labour income, and he 
receives a transfer, TA . The optimal effort level for the high ability individual equals the 
number of hours he works, and at optimal )1( ** le . For the low ability individual 
)1(
**
le . In an environment of full information then the benchmark model is 
implementable. 
 
 
3.1 Only income is observable 
 
Suppose now that the government can observe individuals’ income but not their income 
generating ability. The government is, in this case, not in a position to devise a scheme which 
can separate the deserving applicants from pretenders depending on their abilities. 
 
 
3.1.1 Income taxes 
 
If the government can observe income, but not the income generating ability of the 
individuals, then it can use income taxes to reach its redistributive objective.  
 
Since the low ability individual earns less than the high ability individual, for any amount of 
effort, the government can set up a policy where individuals with low income get transfers 
and those with high pay taxes. Our two individuals are now such that the low ability 
individual is the intended beneficiary. The individuals consume all their total income so that 
we have Ayc , where A is positive for the poor and negative for the rich, and 
)1( lwy . The tax and transfers, in that case, depend on the level of income, and the 
income tax is particularly a function of the income. 
 
Let miny be the minimum income necessary to meet the consumption needs of any individual. 
The government could decide that those who earn less than miny  get some transfer 
))1(( min lwyA , while those with income above miny  pay some non-distorting tax, 
which can be fixed at T, like in the case with full information. Lack of information on income 
generating ability, however, creates a problem here in that individuals may work fewer hours 
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in order to earn min~ yy , and qualify for the transfers yyA ~min . In particular, individuals 
with 1,, ** AulTyu  may choose not to work at all, and receive 
minyA . This is true 
for both high ability and low ability individuals. The condition of reduced labour supply, 
however, reduces the gains of pretending to be poor because of reduced income, and the 
benchmark transfer scheme is only implementable if 
 
)1.3(1,, min** yulTyu  
 
and 
 
)2.3(1,, min
**
yulTyu  
 
are met. That is, if the high ability individual prefers claiming no benefits to reducing his 
labour supply to 0)
~
1( l , and consuming minyA . The low ability individual, in that case, 
does not work at all and claims transfers equal to A. There is redistribution from the high 
ability individual to the low ability individual. This scheme is, however, not efficient in that 
the low ability individual maximizes his utility by adjusting to point 1,miny . He does not 
work at all and claims transfers equal to A, as shown in figure 3.1. (The bold continuous line 
is the opportunity curve for the high ability individual, while the bold dotted line belongs to 
the low ability individual.) 
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If condition (3.1) is met, but not (3.2) such that, instead of (3.2) we have 
1,, min
**
yulTyu , then nobody would apply for transfers and the scheme would not 
lead to any redistribution. In the case where condition (3.2) holds, but (3.1) is not met so that 
instead of (3.1), we have 1,, min** yulTyu , then the problem of implementation 
remains and the policy maker cannot separate the low ability individual from an impostor of 
high ability. The use of lump-sum cash transfers leads to a deadweight loss, in that both 
individuals apply for transfers and nobody pays taxes. The allocations are thus inferior to the 
first best allocations which we get when we have full information. Furthermore, if all 
individuals were to apply for transfers, then the government’s budget constraint (taxes equal 
transfers) would collapse. 
 
If the government now decides that those who earn less than miny  get the transfer 
))1(( min lwyA , but chooses an income tax h(y) for those with income above miny  to 
cover the transfers, then we get new opportunity lines as shown in figure 3.2. The 
redistributive effects of this scheme, however, remain the same as in the case with fixed tax 
level, T. 
y 
l 
 ),( ** lTyu  
Figure 3.1 
 )1,( minyu  
1 
miny  
 ),(
**
lTyu  
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The government’s intention is not to discourage individuals from working as is in the case of 
the two income tax schemes discussed above. I will now discuss a model that offers transfers 
to the low ability individual, while preserving the incentives of both the high ability and the 
low ability individuals to work. 
 
Let now miny  be such that the individual with an income level equal to or less than miny , gets 
a transfer A. The highest consumable (after transfer) income for such an individual is 
Aymin . Let maxy  be such that an individual with income level equal to or greater than maxy , 
pays a tax A, to cover the transfers given to the poor and does not end up at an after-tax 
income level less than Aymin , that is to say AyAy minmax . Individuals with labour 
income between miny  and maxy  pay some income tax, )(yhT .  
 
The government’s problem now is to choose a tax scheme so that some amount A, is 
transferred to those with income less than miny . Since the low ability individual does not have 
an incentive to imitate the high ability individual, we have no need to use marginal taxes, and 
y 
l 
 ),( ** lTyu  
Figure 3.2 
 )1,( minyu  
1 
miny  
 ),(
**
lTyu  
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so for incomes above maxy , the government can use some fixed taxes. The tax level, however, 
should be such that the high ability individual still prefers working and paying taxes to 
reducing his effort level and claiming transfers. The incentive constraint for the high ability 
individual then is 
w
y
AyulTyu
min
min* 1,),( . The government now chooses A= T,  
and for any given values, it also chooses miny , such that 
w
y
AyulTyu
min
min* 1,),( , where  is very small. In so doing, the government 
can make sure that the high ability individual works and pays taxes. The low ability individual 
maximises his utility at 
w
y
Ay
min
min 1, . The government offers a marginal tax rates )(yh  
between miny  and maxy , and this can be up to 100% because nobody allocates his labour 
leisure choice between these points. 
)2.3(
)1(
)1()(
)1(
)(
max
maxmin
min
ylwifA
ylwyifyh
ylwifA
yh  
 
For an individual with wage rate w, such a scheme gives the opportunity lines shown by the 
bold lines in figure 3.3. The continuous line is for the high ability, and the dotted line is for 
the low ability individual. 
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The tax function is now as given in figure 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
If the utility curves are not as “well behaved” as in figure 3.3, then the high ability individual 
may choose to reduce his labour input so as to qualify for transfers. In particular, if he has 
h(y) 
y 
Figure 3.4 
 A 
miny  
 -A 
maxy  
y 
l Figure 3.3 
miny  
 )1(,( ** lTyu  
1 
 )
~
1(,~( lAyu  
A 
maxy
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w
y
l
w
y min*
max
11 , then he may choose to reduce his labour input and maximize his 
utility at 
w
y
Ay
min
min 1, . This because, the individual does not lose any income by 
reducing his labour input. Individuals’ optimal labour-leisure choice depend on the 
government’s choice of A and miny . 
 
For any level of A, a reduction in miny  reduces the number of hours the individuals can work 
in order to gain from the transfer benefits. If we have 0miny , then an individual 
with
w
y
l
w
y min*
max
11  will choose to adjust at )1,(A  as we discussed before.  Reducing 
miny  without increasing A, however, reduces the distributive objective of the government. 
The gap between the high ability individual’s utility curve and that of the low ability 
individual may therefore not be a desirable solution. 
 
Let the timing of the scheme be such that the government chooses a transfer level A=T, then 
given that level, chooses miny  and thus Aymin  and maxy . 
 
Changes in A  
 
A tax reduction from 0T  to 1T  leads to the high ability individual paying less tax and increases 
his utility for any effort level. If the government decreases A, but keeps 
w
y
AyulTyu
min
min* 1,),( , then we have (as shown in figure 3.5) miny  increasing 
from 
min
0y  to 
min
1y  , and 
maxy  increasing from max0y  to 
max
1y , so that the redistributive 
objective is kept. The low ability individual must, however, now work more in order to 
maximise his utility at 
w
y
Ay
min
1
1
min
1 1, . A very low A, however, may not lead to 
significant redistribution. 
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The government can adjust A to create restrictions on the recipients and reduce over 
consumption of the welfare transfer. An increase in the labour demand for the low ability 
individual reduces the gains of being poor. Such an increase can be used to deter the potential 
impostors from pretending and induce them to exert their efficient level of effort. 
 
 
 11 TA  
y 
l Figure 3.5 
min
0y  
1 
 00 TA  
max
0y  
min
1y  
max
1y  
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If the government, on the other hand, increases A, then it has to subsequently reduce miny  so 
that the high ability individual does not pretend to be of low ability. An increase in A reduces 
the poverty gap (as shown in figure 3.6) by the reduced difference between the utility level of 
the high ability individual and that of the low ability individual.  
 
A reduction from 
min
0y  to 
min
1y , also enables the government to increase taxes without the fear 
of the high ability individual pretending to be of low ability. Thus, the government is able to 
collect enough taxes to cover the amount needed for the transfers to the low ability individual. 
A very high A and very low miny  may, however, lead to the low ability individual adjusting to 
(A,1), as before. This therefore limits the process of reducing miny  and the ability to reduce 
the poverty gap between the two individuals. 
 
y 
l Figure 3.6 
min
0y  
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 00 TA  max
0y  
min
1y  
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3.1.2 Work requirement 
 
As discussed above, the policy maker faces some limitations on how far he can reduce or 
increase A. This may make it difficult or impossible to screen out all potential impostors. In 
such cases, using work requirement in addition to income tax may provide a solution. 
 
Work requirement is a restriction on the welfare programs, where those who apply are 
required to work )1( ww le  hours and receive a transfer wy . These labour requirements are 
often a combination of activities that are intended to improve the recipient's employment 
prospects (such as training, rehabilitation and work experience), and those designated as 
contributing to society (such as unpaid or underpaid work). In order to distinguish between 
the labour effort exerted in work requirement activities and that exerted elsewhere, I will refer 
to all labour within work requirement activities as labour in the public sector, and all others as 
labour in the private sector. Work requirement can be implemented in the case with full 
information, but given that the labour in the work requirement is less productive, then the 
benchmark model provides better results. 
 
The use of work requirement as a restriction to those who claim welfare, however, has a 
separating effect. Besley and Coate (1992) argue that because the high ability individuals 
have a higher opportunity cost of supplying hours of their time than the low ability 
individuals, work requirement has a screening effect that separates those who deserve 
assistance from would be impostors. I will in this section develop on my model from the 
previous part and discuss some of the findings in Besley and Coate (1992). 
 
Income is still observable and the policy maker can set an income tax )(yhT , for all 
incomes above miny , as before. Each individual chooses whether to or not to claim the benefit 
package ),( ww yl , and if they do so, then they must work )1( wl hours in the public sector. 
They may also continue to supply as much labour as they want in the private sector.  
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The basic idea is that for any )1( l hours worked, the low ability individual gets lower 
amount of consumption goods than the high ability individual who faces a better trade off 
between consumption good and leisure. If the low ability individual took the package, then he 
would face a budget line starting from point ),( ww yl  with a slope equal to w . As illustrated in 
figure 3.6, this budget line will always be above his original one and for any wllˆ . He now 
has a utility level higher than the one he would get if he did not participate in the program. 
Alternatively, for any income level above wy , he now works less than he would have to if he 
did not participate in the program, in particular, he now has to work *1 wl  hours, (which are 
fewer than 
min
1 l ) in order to have an after transfer income equal to miny . This increases his 
utility level.  
 
On the other hand, if a high ability individual accepts the same package, then he will end up at 
a budget line starting from point ),( ww yl , but with a slope equal to w .  
 
y 
l 
 )1( lwy  
Figure 3.6 
miny  
 )1( lwy  
1 
wl  
wy  
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As shown in figure 3.7, this budget line is always below his original one and for any wllˆ , 
he now has utility level lower than the one he would get if he did not participate in the 
program. Alternatively, for any income level above wy , he would now work more than he had 
to if he did not participate in the program. This would reduce his utility level. He thus has no 
incentive to pretend to be of low ability and apply for welfare. Such a scheme is both 
incentive compatible and results to optimal second best allocations, which separate the two 
different types. 
 
Any work requirement scheme such that for any amount of effort )1( wl , the returns wy  is 
such that )1()1( www lwylw , has the separating effect. The budget line for the high 
ability individual will always be below his original one, so he will not apply for the welfare 
transfers. 
 
 
y 
l 
 )1( lwy  
Figure 3.7 
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3.2 Unobservable income and income generating abilities 
 
Suppose now that the government can neither observe individuals’ income nor income 
generating ability. In this case, it knows that one individual has low ability and the other has 
high, but cannot tell who is who. In Besley and Coate (1992), the authors discuss a situation 
where the government knows the fraction of the total population that is of low ability and that 
which is of high ability, but it cannot tell what group each individual belongs to. The 
individuals in my discussion can be seen as representative members of the groups in Besley 
and Coate (1992). 
 
Like in the case where only income could be observed, attempts to implement the benchmark 
case will lead to over consumption of the welfare transfers. The information gap also leads to 
failure to implement income tax, because individuals may choose to report wrong income 
levels so as to avoid paying taxes. Work requirement, however, follows the same structure as 
in the case with observable income. The separating work requirement here is to offer ),( ww yl , 
which leads to the benefits from the scheme being higher than the loss caused by the low 
ability individual having to work less in the private sector. As discussed in the previous 
section, and as shown in figure 3.8, any work requirement scheme ),( ww yl  such that 
Tlwylw www )1()1( , will increase the utility level of the low ability individual, and 
at the same time deter the high ability individual from participating. 
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Very high work time requirement with relatively little returns may, however, discourage the 
truly poor from participating in the program. On the other hand, very high returns relative to 
the work requirement in the work requirement programs may not be cost minimising. 
Our problem given that income is unobservable, is how to collect the amount used for 
transfers. This can be done, for example, by a head tax on all those who do not apply for 
transfers. Besley and Coate (1992) discuss a case where, work requirement programs come 
with costs for the policy maker in form of a public sectors’ input needed to obtain transfers, 
and argue that in such a case, the policy maker also has an incentive to minimize these costs. I 
will not, in this thesis, discuss how the government can obtain transfers, but assume that it has 
certain cost minimizing way of doing so. If so, then it can use work requirement to achieve 
redistribution. 
The amount of effort the applicants exert in the private sector now, depends on whether or not 
we have income effect, that is, whether the welfare program affects the labour supply or not. 
In the case where we have income effect, then the low ability individuals can now reach miny , 
y 
l 
 )1( lwy  
Figure 3.8 
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and thus ),( min lyu  with fewer total labour hours. In this case, the individual may choose to 
increase his utility of the consumption good and leisure, by increasing both his leisure time 
and the level of consumption good.  
 
 
Figure 3.9 shows that if we have income effect, then the low ability individual may increase 
his utility from ),( 00 lyu  to ),( 11 lyu  by increasing both his leisure time and income. 
 
If leisure is neither a normal nor inferior good, then we do not have income effect for leisure. 
In such a case, the individual still works the same number of hours as before, but now has 
more income, thus higher utility, given that income is a normal good. Such a case is defined 
by )( 10 ll , that is, the individuals work the same amount of hours in the presence of welfare 
transfers, as they would in the case without.  
 
y 
l 
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Figure 3.10 shows a case without income effect and therefore, no change in effort level due to 
work requirement. Let )1()1( 0
** lle  be the low ability individual’s optimal level of 
effort in the absence of work requirement. In this case, a work requirement smaller than 
)1( 0l  causes an equal reduction in private sector labour supply, while a work requirement in 
above )1( 0l  may cause the individual to cease all work in the private sector. 
The work requirement model assumes that poverty is caused by low income generating 
ability. Poverty can, however, also be caused by disutility of labour due to health situations 
(physical or psychological). Certain individuals may also have a higher utility of income than 
others of the same level of labour income and income generating ability due to exogenous 
factors, such as health costs or family sizes. As a result, individuals may either not be able to 
work as much as required under the work requirement programs, or have higher consumption 
costs relative to their total income. When poverty is caused by disutility of labour or by 
relative utility of income, then work requirement would not be useful. This because, 
controlling for income generating ability, work requirement would discourage the truly poor 
with high disutility of labour, or high relative utility of income, from taking part. When the 
disutility of labour is not caused by health problems, it may be reasonable to argue that the 
y 
l 
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society has no obligation to help high ability individuals who are unwilling to work. However, 
when disutility of labour is due to health situations or by utility of income, then we need other 
measures than the income generating ability, to distinguish between the truly needy and the 
potential impostors. An optimal welfare program in its totality would here be such that these 
individuals be identified and be offered benefits of their own. If such a benefit does not exist, 
then work requirement programs alone fail to be optimal in helping all the truly poor in the 
society. Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982), and Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) discuss how 
welfare can be offered in the form of in-kind transfers (such as medical treatments), valued 
only by those individuals with the relevant disability. High ability poor individuals would 
have no incentive to pretend that they had the unobservable disability, since what they would 
receive amounts to a transfer of lower value. This is especially so because in-kind transfers 
are inferior to cash transfers due to their restrictions, especially in cases of no re-sale. 
I will in the next sections discuss the use of in-kind transfers as an effective redistributive 
instrument, when income tax and work requirement programs fail to target the desired groups. 
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4 Imperfect information: 
Poverty caused by relative utility of income 
 
Suppose now, that poverty is not only caused by income generating ability, but also by 
individual’s relative utility of income. We here consider individuals, who have a high relative 
utility of income. For them, it is so that for any level of income, they have relatively higher 
consumptions expenses, than others of the same income level and/or income generating 
ability. These consumption costs could be due to size of the family, medical treatment, special 
housing, or transport situation. An important factor here is that the cause of poverty is 
exogenous. Two individuals with the same income generating ability may have equal amount 
of income, but different utility of income in such cases. Cash is no longer better than kind, 
and as Blackorby and Donaldson (1998) write, "marginal willingness-to-pay equal to 
marginal cost" is not a good cost-benefit rule. Even with optimal income tax and work 
requirement schemes, the individuals with higher relative utility of income would benefit 
from any additional redistribution, and policy instruments beyond work requirement, and 
income tax and transfers may be social economically beneficial. I will now extend my 
definition of the truly deserving individual from the low ability individuals, to include those 
with relatively high utility of income. Poverty can also be caused by individuals’ relative 
disutility of labour, and here we include those who because of health reasons may not 
participate in the labour market. Such individuals may not benefit from programmes that 
require them to work more, so that income tax and work requirement schemes fail to increase 
their utility. I will, however, stick to my denotation and refer to the truly deserving as low 
ability, and potential impostors as high ability individuals. I will, in this section, discuss how 
in-kind transfers may have a separating effect on the potential applicants of this nature. 
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4.1 Only income is observable 
 
Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) present a simple model, where they divide the population in 
the society into two groups, the infirm and the able. Full information setting here, implies that 
the government, has the required information about individuals’ disutility of labour and utility 
of income, and can distinguish between the potential impostors, and the truly deserving. The 
benchmark model can then be implemented in such an environment. In that case, the 
government taxes the able and offers transfers to the infirm. Income tax and work 
requirement, as mentioned, fail to target these individuals, and we need extra redistribution 
instruments. 
 
If the government can only observe individuals’ income, but not their types, then the 
benchmark model leads to over consumption of the welfare goods and services, and certain 
individuals may apply for transfers that they do not qualify for. Income taxes and work 
requirements still fail to target these truly deserving individuals. In-kind transfers can then be 
used as the additional distribution instrument. In-kind transfers involve transfers of goods or 
services to the truly deserving individual. 
 
Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) show that, the optimal in-kind transfers that satisfy self-
selection constraints in this environment, lead to the transfers to the infirm not being 
"overprovided". Besley and Coate (1991) also show that this is true by the use of a simple 
structure to study public provision of private goods and how this causes redistribution. The 
authors consider the public provision of an indivisible good, which is produced in different 
variants, each embodying a particular quality level. Every person may consume only one 
variant of this good; they cannot be combined, an example is education. The quality is normal 
in the sense that, people with higher income levels would opt for higher quality variants of the 
good. Redistribution is then achieved as long as only the poor households consume the good. 
An important point to make here, as Slesnick (1996) argues, is that, the ability of in-kind 
transfers to alleviate poverty depends on accurate targeting. The government must therefore, 
in this case, be able to target the correct good that it provides in the form of in-kind transfers. 
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4.1.1 The use of rent allowances, restriction on consumption bundles 
 
Ear-marked transfers such as rent allowances can be looked at as in-kind transfers. Cash 
transfers have the property of efficiently transferring purchasing power from one individual to 
another, in that, the amount transferred has the same value for both individuals. Economists 
argue that, as Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) write, this property (of efficient transfer of 
purchasing power) is not always shared by transfers of goods and services, when resale is 
difficult or impossible. This makes cash-transfers superior to in-kind transfers. Given, 
however, that the restrictions are intended, the value of a restrictive in-kind transfer may be 
equal to that of a cash-transfer. This is especially true in a setting where, the preference of the 
individuals is not publicly available to the government, and we cannot assume as above that 
all individuals face the same utility function. In such cases, as Blackorby and Donaldson 
(1988) show, the superiority of transfers of purchasing power over transfers of goods and 
services disappears. 
 
I will, in this section, discuss how the use of in-kind transfers may have a separating effect on 
the potential applicants. I will still use the simplified assumption, that there are only two 
individuals in the community, one intended beneficiary, and another who is supposed to pay 
the taxes to cover the transfers. However, instead of their types being determined by income 
generating ability, as before, I will here assume that our individual types differ due to their 
marginal utility of income, determined exogenous factors such as health condition and 
expenses, family size, special requirements, among others. These individuals now have the 
same amount of labour income, but different utility functions denoted u  for the poor and u  
for the rich. Individual types are randomly distributed, and the government does not know the 
individuals’ types. 
In section 3.1, we assumed that all the individuals had to do was to choose whether or not to 
apply for transfers. In reality, and as we will assume in this section, individuals must also 
choose how to allocate their income on various consumption goods and services. The 
consumption good particularly, is divided into quantities of specific goods, and each 
individual chooses a consumption bundle to maximize his utility, subject to the constraint that 
total expenditure does not exceed his total after-tax (transfer) income. For each individual, 
total income will now be spent on house rent, or any other goods, that is, Alwcr )1( , 
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if he gets a transfer A, or )1( lwcr , if he has to only rely on his labour income. w and l  
are now fixed and therefore, the labour income given. Assume that the poor individual’s 
optimal residential requirement is worth 
*
r , while the rich individual’s optimal residential 
requirement is worth *r . If we have a cash-transfer, then the poor individual has an after 
transfer income of Alw )1( , out of which he pays 
*
r as house rent. If the rich individual 
had the same income, then he would still use *r to pay his house rent. As illustrated in figure 
4.1, income effect may lead to the individuals increasing their expenditure on residential 
apartments given that their income goes up. I will, however, for simplicity assume that this is 
not the case. 
I will here, discuss how restrictions on consumption bundles, can be used to discourage the 
potential impostors from applying for transfers that are not meant for them. 
Assume that the poor individual has higher housing costs than the rich one, that is, assume 
** rr . Fixed leisure now allows us to consider the utility as a function of the consumption 
goods, namely c and r, so we have ),( rcuu . For any given level of income, the individuals 
maximise their utilities by the poor choosing 
*
r  and the rich choosing *r . Such a relation can 
be illustrated by figure 4.1 below, where we have the amount spent on house rent on the x-
axis, and that spent on other goods on the y-axis. 
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Let a transfer scheme now be such that, the government provides house rent subsidies to any 
individual who applies for transfers. This transfer is such that an individual whose residential 
requirement is worth *r , pays an amount *rr g , and gets *r in house rent allowance. Such 
an individual then has gg rAlwc )1( , to spend on other goods. In order to discourage 
the potential impostor from applying for the transfers, the government can design a scheme 
such that it only gives transfers to individuals with high residential costs, that is, those with 
** rr . The individual with 
** rr  , in this case, does not benefit from applying for 
transfers, as shown by the two individuals’ opportunity curve (the bold line) in figure 4.2, 
where 
*min rr . 
 
Figure 4.1 
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The poor individual now pays gr , and gets an apartment worth 
*
r . He also has 
gc  to use on 
the purchase of other consumption goods. The rich individual does not apply for the transfers 
since the bundle ),( gg rc would lead give him a lower level of utility. This solution, however, 
only has a separating effect if *r  is sufficiently less than 
*
r . 
 
When 
** rr , and when apartments vary in quality, then inferior in-kind transfers can be 
used to discourage the rich from applying for transfers. Inferior in-kind transfers are such that 
for given quality levels, the potential impostor would be prefer to get off the transfer scheme, 
and pay more for an apartment of his own choice. The quality of the apartment can be 
determined by factors such as location, size, and facilities in the apartment, among others.  
 
Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) discuss an example of inferior in-kind transfers, where they 
argue that if rape victims are offered transfers of cash, then everyone has an interest in 
qualifying. But if counselling is provided instead, then only the intended beneficiaries will be 
interested in the transfer. In an asymmetric information setting, as long as it is impossible or 
costly to distinguish victims from other people, there is an advantage to supplying the 
Figure 4.2 
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counselling service over offering cash transfers. This observation, the authors write, applies to 
many other social services, and to medical care and education. A similar argument will 
support the use of low quality housing facilities when the government uses house rent 
subsidies, or provision of apartments, as a redistribution instrument. An important fact here is 
that resale is not possible, so that in our case, then the recipients would have to live in simple 
apartments in certain areas. 
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5 From static to dynamic model 
 
Static models, as the ones used in chapters 2 and 3, are suitable to describe, or discuss 
situations where decisions made in one period, have no effect over what happens in other 
periods. We say that in such situations, changes in variables in one period do not have spill 
over effects into the variables in other periods. As we saw, effort exerted in each period only 
affects individuals’ outcomes in that period, and we did not consider the future. 
 
The conditions for Oslo municipality, are such that individuals have to use up their savings in 
order get social assistance, and/or house rent allowance. These conditions include those that 
oblige individuals to sell any belongings that the family may not need, such as cabins, 
caravans, etc. In the absence of savings, all income is consumed in the same period, and each 
period can be treated on its own, such that our static models correctly describe the 
environment in which decisions are made. 
 
Real life decisions, however, besides moment to moment decisions, also contain dynamic 
economic decisions and choices, and these cannot be addressed by our one stage model. That 
is because, in reality, individuals consider not only the present consumption and leisure 
bundles, but also those of a future time. Individuals must therefore choose not only how much 
to spend in the present period, but also how much to invest and/or save for the future. Effort 
decisions made today may not only affect consumption and leisure bundles today, but may 
have a lagging effect into the future. Individuals therefore, for example, invest time and 
money in education so that they may have better labour income in the future. Such 
investments may require a reduction in the present consumption and leisure bundle. Decisions 
concerning where to stay in the future may include the decision of whether to sell or buy 
apartments, and such may affect today’s income and expenditure decisions. A high ability 
individual may have to choose between renting and buying an apartment. In order to buy in 
the future, individuals may have to get some jobs, and save some labour income. The costs of 
house loans will affect how much they have to save. In such cases, communal loaning system 
come in the picture in that it offers affordable loans to those who may not be able to have 
access to the private credit market. Another important concern for the policy makers is how 
long individuals depend on welfare systems. This concern is especially relevant in the case of 
foreigners, where social assistance is meant to keep them out of poverty at arrival into the 
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country, but that they should also be able to carter for themselves as time goes by. This is an 
important part of the debate concerning the integration of foreigners into the Norwegian 
society. The dynamic dependency on welfare assistance also concerns individuals who lose 
their jobs for one or another reason, and who in the best case, should receive economic 
assistance in the short run, but be able to return to the labour market in the long run. Many 
economic decisions are significantly influenced by what firms, households, and the 
government anticipate about the future, and as time goes by, these expectations are adjusted, 
and so is the response to them, and this adjustment process takes several time periods. In 
order to address these situations, we must use models that take different periods of time into 
consideration. Such models are referred to as dynamic models. 
 
In this section we assume, as Besley and Coate (1992), that poverty is not only caused by bad 
luck, but also by choices made in the initial period, here expressed in the level of effort 
exerted in the present period, in order to get out of poverty in later periods. Individuals’ 
earning abilities in the later periods will depend on acquired skills and relevant qualifications 
for new jobs in Norway, and this, does not only depend on luck in the form of genetic 
endowment, or previous experience, but also on the level of effort exerted in the initial period 
in acquiring these skills. In the case of foreigners, these skills may among others, include 
language skills. 
 
5.1 A simple two period basic model where the individuals are 
of low ability in the first period 
 
In this section, I will use a simple two period model of consumption good and effort, to study 
how economic transfers may affect the labour-leisure choices of individuals in a dynamic set-
up. A two period model is a simplification of reality, but it enables us to address some 
dynamic moments in the real life decision making. The length of each period may vary, 
depending on what assumptions we make and which groups we study. In the case of 
integration of immigrants, the first period will depend on how long the introduction program 
lasts, and may vary from individual to individual. The actual numbers may affect the actual 
amounts of resources used but do not, in any way, distort the analysis and conclusions in this 
section. 
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Let our individual’s life now be divided into two periods where in the first period, the 
individual depends on social welfare. This could be because the individual is a new arrival in 
Norway, and lacks the necessary qualifications to get into the labour market, or that he has 
lost his previous job, and needs to acquire new skills to increase his chances of getting a new 
one. The individual exerts some effort in the first period, and gains the necessary skills to get 
him out of the poverty in the second period. I will simplify my model and let this effort to be 
equal to the amount of hours invested in activities that may increase one’s skills, that is, 
11 1 le . In the second period, the individual has an income that is dependent on the skills 
acquired in the first period. Let the individual with probability , be of high ability in the 
second period. This implies that he earns an income above the poverty line by exerting 
relatively less effort as compared to a situation where he was of low ability.  is an 
increasing and strictly concave function of the level of effort exerted in the first period. We 
therefore have 0)('',0)(',)( 111 eee , which means that higher level of effort 
gives higher chances of being high ability in period, but at a decreasing rate. )1(  is the 
probability that an individual is of low ability, and depends on welfare system in the second 
period. There are those who will get out of poverty in the second period, and there are those 
who will not. These now respectively form our new definition of high ability and low ability 
individuals. Welfare assistance should now be focused so that those who can make it out, get 
out of poverty in the second period. 
 
Each individual now cares for the utility of consumption and leisure in both periods and 
maximizes 
 
)1.5(),())1(1(),()1(),( 22122111 lcullcullcu  
 
For each individual, there are unique effort levels 
*
1
*
1 1 le , and 
*
2
*
2 1 le , which solve 
the problem. In the first period, he only knows his expected utility in the second period, and 
the amount of effort exerted in the first period therefore, depends on the expected gains in the 
second period. For any ),(),( 2222 lculcu , higher )1( 1l will lead to higher second period 
returns to effort exerted in the first period. And the larger the difference between the two 
utility levels in the second period, the higher the effort level exerted in the first period that is 
to say that, 1e increases with the difference between the utility of being high ability, and that 
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of being low ability in the second period. In this dynamic setup, the level of effort exerted in 
the first period affects the number of the poor in the second period, thus making the expected 
number of the poor in the second period endogenous. We therefore need programs that give 
individuals incentives to exert efficient level of effort in both periods. We especially need 
programs, where the individuals exert the optimal level of effort so as to get out of poverty in 
the second period. Work requirement has come out as a popular instrument here. 
 
We assume that the individuals know their efforts, but that this is unobservable to the policy 
maker. The individuals, on their side, know the structure of the government’s welfare 
program. 
 
5.2 Only income is observable 
 
Assume now, that the policy maker can only observe the individuals’ income, but not type or 
effort level in both periods. Individual types in the second period, is now determined by how 
effort exerted in period one affects the individuals’ income generating ability in the second 
period. A high ability individual now, is one who, by exerting his optimal effort level can gain 
the required skills and get of poverty, while a low ability individual does not. There is no 
difference in individual types in the first period. Both lack necessary skills to participate in the 
labour market and depend on welfare assistance. The benchmark program is now problematic 
because it reduces the utility difference between the high ability individual and the low ability 
individual in the second period, thereby, reducing the returns to effort exerted in the first 
period. Individuals may choose lower effort level than optimal and the number of poor is 
higher in the second period, thus creating unnecessarily long-run dependence on the welfare 
system. This problem is also true for all programmes that reduce utility difference between 
high ability and low ability individuals in the second period like income tax schemes. Work 
requirement in the second period may lead to the individuals exerting the optimal level of 
effort in both periods, as I will discuss in the next section. 
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5.2.1 Work requirement as a deterrent instrument 
 
I will follow Besley and Coates (1992) second argument, that work requirement can be used 
to deter high ability individuals from choosing effort levels, in the first period, which will lead 
to them being poor in the second period. The authors define maximal work requirement as the 
work requirement which, if coupled with a transfer sufficient to get the poor above the 
poverty line, would make them just indifferent between participating and not participating in 
the welfare program. Let )1( maxmax ww le , denote this maximal work requirement and 
max
wy , 
the returns got from the public sector at exerting )1( maxmax ww le . The interaction is then such 
that the policy maker offers ),( maxmax ww yl , and each individual chooses whether or not to claim 
the benefit package. If they do, then they must work )1( maxwl hours in the public sector and 
earn maxwy . 
 
In the first period, all individuals have no skills and choose how much effort to exert in 
acquiring them so as to get out of poverty in the second period. This may include taking 
formal education or participating in some training programs, so as to achieve the necessary 
skills required to participate in the labour market. He may also depend on some welfare 
program according to the static models discussed in chapters 3 and 4, but we, in this section, 
do not consider these programs or any effects they may have on the individuals’ choices. All 
we focus on is that, each individual chooses some level of effort to exert so as to get out of 
poverty in the second period. 
 
In the second period, the individual is either of high ability or low ability. If he is of high 
ability, then he works in the private sector and consumes his labour income. If he is of low 
ability, then he now participates in a work requirement program in order to get transfers from 
the government.  The nature of the program may be that the individual gains certain skills that 
can enable him to get out of poverty in the future, but again, for simplicity, we do not focus 
on this in the following discussion. Any individual who participates in the work requirement 
program now gets a package, ),( maxmax ww yl . 
 
I will now discuss how work requirement program in the second period may affect 
individuals’ effort choice in the first period. 
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For any utility level in the first period, we now have a situation where each individual is also 
concerned about the expected utility of consumption and leisure in the second period given 
by, 
)2.5(),())1(1(),()1( 221221 lcullcul
 
 
From (5.2), we get 
)3.5(),(),()1(),( 2222122 lculcullcu
  
 
and see that the expected utility of consumption and leisure in the second period, depends on 
the difference between ),( 22 lcu and ),( 22 lcu , as mentioned earlier. If the government offers a 
work requirement package ),( maxmax ww yl , such that 
max
wy  is enough only to cover the costs of 
subsistence, then it can set max
wl such that difference between ),( 22 lcu and ),( 22 lcu is not 
affected. According to Besley and Coates (1992), this can be reached by setting 
)),1((),( maxmax llwulyu ww , and 
minmax yyw , as shown in figure 5.1. This is because, any 
individual who does not get out of poverty in the second period, will have to participate in the 
work requirement program, and does not benefit from any other welfare programs. For such 
an individual, ),( 22 lcu  equals ),(
maxmax
ww lyu . 
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)),1((),( maxmax llwulyu ww , and 
minmax yyw , imply that the individual without skills, is 
indifferent between taking the package, or leaving it. 
 
We have ww ll
max
 because at wl , the individual without skills earns )1( wlw , which is less 
than miny . For a work requirement equal to maxwl , the low ability individual does not work in 
the private sector because that would reduce his utility. If we have ww ll
max
, then the work 
requirement will not have the intended effect because ww ll
max
, must be coupled with a 
transfer )1( maxmin wlwy , in order to achieve the poverty alleviation goal. Such a scheme 
reduces the difference between ),( 22 lcu and ),( 22 lcu . This is because the individuals will be 
able to receive an after transfer income of miny , but work less than )1( wl hours. This may 
not give the individuals without skills an incentive to exert the optimal effort level, in the first 
period, to get out of poverty in the second period. ww ll
max
 reduces the gains that the 
individuals without skills may get from the welfare system. The leisure time under the work 
program can, however, not be less than maxwl , because that would leave the individual without 
y 
 
)1( lwy
 
l 
 
)1( lwy
 
l 
Figure 5.1 
minmax yyw  
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wl  
wy  
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wl  
 ),( 22 lcu  
l 
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skills better off not participating in the program, since it gives utility levels lower than 
)),1(( llwu . 
 
A high ability individual who does not get of poverty in the first period, will have to 
participate in the program in the second period and end up at point ),( maxmax ww yl , which (as 
shown in figure 5.2) gives lower utility than if he got out of poverty and did not participate in 
the program.  
 
 
 
The number of the poor in the second period falls with an increase in the level of effort 
exerted. The probability of getting out of poverty may also depend on how well the skills 
acquired in the first period target the labour market. 
 
 may also capture an individual’s chances of getting a job in the second period, given that 
he is of high ability then. Job opportunities in the second period may therefore, also affect the 
level of effort exerted in period one. The lower the chances of getting a job is in period two, 
the lower the effort exerted in period one. This affects the effectiveness of work requirement. 
Besley and Coate (1992) argue therefore, that the work requirement can only be an effective 
y 
l 
Figure 5.2 
minmax yyw   )1( lwy  
1 
wl  
wy  
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wl  
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deterrent if the amount of work demanded is considerably in excess to that which the low 
ability individuals would do in the absence of intervention. 
 
An important feature here is that, when considering the dynamics of the interaction, we see 
that it is important to induce the individuals to exert effort levels today that may lead to them 
getting out of poverty tomorrow. When poverty, however, is caused by disutility of labour due 
to health problems, or relative utility of income, then individuals’ future utility does not 
improve by them participating in work requirement schemes. In such cases, in-kind transfers, 
as discussed in chapter four, are more effective instruments to achieve redistribution. 
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6 Recipient targeting and the welfare programs in 
Oslo municipality 
 
In chapters three, four and five, I discussed how recipient-targeting may reduce the loss 
caused by the asymmetric information that the policy maker faces when designing a transfer 
scheme. My discussions in those sections were, however, model based and did not discuss the 
possible application of the results in a real life welfare program. The purpose of this section is 
to discuss how the welfare programs of Oslo municipality, as the benevolent policy maker, 
can be compared to these model based discussions. 
 
In economic theory, the term moral hazard is used to refer to the possibility that the 
redistribution of risk changes people's behaviour. The term originated from, and is commonly 
used in the insurance industry, where insurance may transfer risk from the insured to the 
insurer, such that, for example, an individual whose automobile is insured against theft, may 
be less vigilant in locking the vehicle than one who is not insured. In our discussion, we may 
use it to refer to situations, where the provision of welfare goods and services may transfer the 
risk of being without labour income from the applicants of welfare, and thus lead them to 
behave in different ways in order to claim larger economic assistance from the social welfare. 
Moral hazard here, will lead to higher costs for the municipality because of the possible gains 
enjoyed by the social clients who may not qualify for the transfers. This happens because the 
social client considers only his private gains, which may be equal to his private costs but less 
than the social economic costs for the whole community, given that some one else has to work 
and pay taxes that are used to cover these costs. Individuals’ labour-leisure choice may thus 
be affected in that, more individuals may choose to go to the social agency instead of looking 
for a paid job if their utility of working and earning a given income level, is less than that of 
staying home and receiving social assistance. Sicknesses may also be exaggerated so as to not 
go to work. In economics terms, the social insurance lowers the costs of not being employed 
or earning less, and the individuals in return consumes more. More particularly, the real cost 
of consumption is now less for the individual and he in return buys an inefficiently large sum. 
For an individual who receives a transfer A, the real cost of consumption (as can be calculated 
from the budget constraint, Awwlc ), now becomes 
w
Ac
, which is less than 
w
c
 for 
any A>0. 
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Given that Oslo municipality makes its decisions under an environment of asymmetric 
information, just as the one under which the instruments in chapters three, four, and five, the 
policies designed may only at best achieve second-best allocation. The first step to separating 
the deserving recipients from the potential impostors is documentation. 
 
Oslo municipality, like other municipalities, requires that an applicant document that he does 
not have an income level that can meet his daily needs. It is expected that those who can work 
to afford their consumption do so, and that only those eligible, benefit from the welfare 
system. The amount one gets may also be attached to marital status and the number of 
children one has. An individual seeking economic help must be able to document that he has 
less money than is necessary to meet his needs. He therefore, must present his financial 
documents to the relevant authority and these documents give the required indicators. The 
interaction is based on the hope that those applying for economic assistance give the right 
information. This can, however, not be controlled so we have an information gap between the 
municipality and the applicants, in that the applicant may have access to information that is 
not available to the municipality, and the policy maker in the municipality cannot be sure that 
the information he gets is always correct. Information monitoring is often impossible or 
expensive. 
 
Incentive problems arise when the policy maker wants to choose how much economic 
assistance to give an applicant in that, the applicants may attempt to claim transfers meant for 
others. As mentioned above, the applicant has different interests than those of the policy 
maker, and he may have an incentive to incompletely and/or inaccurately, offer the 
information needed to make optimal decisions. The real costs of working for the applicant, the 
opportunity costs of leisure, is an example of pieces of information that the agent may have as 
private information, and this may have fundamental implications to the contracts offered by 
the municipality. An applicant may, for example, report that he is more sick than he actually 
is, or a higher effort in searching for jobs, so as to justify staying unemployed. Inefficient 
effort level or inaccurate information by the applicant may lead to the municipality making an 
inefficient decision about the transfer scheme to design.  
 
The level of effort put in looking for labour, may affect one’s chances of getting a job and 
this, will further affect access to social welfare.  Individuals may choose to work in the black 
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market and not report this as part of their wage income. In that case, they will fail to report the 
correct number of hours worked. Individuals may present divorce papers in order to get the 
benefits of single parents, yet continue to stay together. By not saving all the money in a bank, 
individuals may be able to give false amount of wealth. In brief, it is not possible to 
distinguish between individuals, and the municipality must use economic instruments to 
separate the potential impostors from the deserving applicants. The instruments, as discussed 
in chapters three, four and five, cause a deadweight loss. 
 
In our set-up, the uncertainty is endogenous in that the applicant’s behaviour is determined 
within the interaction. How sick the agent reports to be, may be determined by the possible 
gains to be got from the social welfare relative to those from labour income. Whether to work 
in the black market or not, is affected by the gains of keeping the labour wages private and the 
chances of being detected. Because the total welfare gain by single parents is higher than 
those of a family living together, a couple may have the incentives to present divorce papers 
but continue to stay together. In the dynamic setup, the amount of effort one puts to get out of 
poverty in the first period is determined by the gap between the benefits of being out of 
poverty in the second period, and that of staying poor and receiving social assistance. 
 
Most of the discussion, in this part, will be based on the information got from the web pages 
of the department for labour and resource management, NAV, and discussions with staff at 
health and welfare department in Oslo municipality. The goal is to give an insight into the 
various schemes used by Oslo municipality, and see how they relate to the instruments I have 
discussed in chapters three, four and five. My discussion will, however, be general and not go 
into the details of the various transfer schemes and their benefits. Detailed discussion that 
addresses the various schemes, and the related costs and benefits figures, is not within the 
scope of a masters thesis. An important point I will try to put across is that, in order to target 
the various individual types in the society, policy makers in the municipality must use 
different types of instruments. 
 
When poverty is caused by income generating ability, then the policy maker can either use 
income tax and cash transfers, or work requirement. 
 
6.1 Income tax 
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The use of income tax and cash transfers can be compared to the municipality’s use of social 
assistance, where individuals get a fixed amount which I denoted A, in chapter three. 
Economic assistance or social help, as it is normally referred to, shall, according to the social 
service law (sosialtjenesteloven), ensure that all individuals have enough resources to meet 
their subsistence demands 
 
The benefit is meant to be temporary, and in order to be received, the applicants should have 
tried other ways out first. This means that these individuals shall have exploited all their 
income generating ability, social welfare, work requirement, or their capital, and/or reduced 
their expenditures. This is in line with the fact that the benefits should encourage people, to 
work and not adjust to (A,1). I have, in this thesis, considered a simple case with only 
individuals. In reality, though, applicants may belong to households and in such cases, the 
policy maker will consider the income of the other members of the household. This does not, 
however, change the general conclusions concerning the effects of social assistance. The only 
difference is that we now have several individuals being considered together. 
The state proposes rates which should be able to cover the costs of subsistence such as: food, 
clothing and subsistence, TV, newspaper leisure and travel expenditure, etc. These rates, 
however, work only as guidelines and each municipality decides the final rates of subsistence. 
All applications are considered on individual basis depending on individual economic, health 
and social situation, that is to say, individual’s type as defined in chapter three. The benefits 
shall enable the individuals to cater for his subsistence, and the municipality has the duty and 
right to decide what types of expenses are necessary to ensure a reasonable subsistence, that is 
to say that, it considers the individuals’ utility. 
As per January 2006, Oslo municipality’ value for A was NOK 4760 for single recipients, 
NOK 3580 for a recipient with a non recipient spouse or cohabitant, NOK 7470 for a couple, 
and NOK 5420 for single parents. The municipality does not have any fixed minimum 
income, but gives assistance to those whose labour income is less than their consumption 
costs and this, after they have exploited all their income generating ability and reduced their 
consumption to basic subsistence level. 
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As discussed in chapter three, social assistance helps redistribute income and increases the 
utility of the low ability individuals. Given that the municipality encourages individuals to try 
other methods first, and to exploit all their income generating ability before applying for 
social assistance, and given that social assistance can be given to supplement the individuals’ 
income, the scheme used by the municipality can be compared to the one in the model 
illustrated in figure 3.3. And as discussed, in that section, such scheme encourages individuals 
to work and when their income is supplemented, their utility is increased for any given level 
of income. 
 
Other incomes, however, do not directly imply labour income, and it is possible to get other 
welfare benefits, for example, disability benefits (uføretrygd) and social assistance. In the 
cases where the benefits got as disabled is higher than the possible eventual income earned in 
labour situation, individuals may have the incentive to apply for these benefits and therefore 
stay out of work. Such a combination then works against the goal of keeping individuals in 
labour, even when they receive social assistance to supplement their income. This can, for 
example, be true for individuals who have so little labour skills that if they worked, then they 
would earn less than if they claimed disability benefits. 
 
By setting values for A and their corresponding miny , the government uses a non-welfarist 
definition of poverty to increase individuals’ welfare. This may, however, not be achieved in 
all cases because individual utility is subjective. 
 
Social assistance is meant to be short term, but given that it has no work requirement, and that 
it reduces the future poverty gap also, then social assistance may serve as a poverty gap, in 
that individuals may have no incentive to exert any effort to get out of poverty in the long-run. 
 
Income tax has distorting effect in that if the labour taxes are very high, then individuals may 
choose to work less and pay less tax. Such a situation, may lead to more individuals preferring 
to apply for social assistance also. However, if the tax level is controlled such that this 
distorting effect is minimized, and the social economic gains got in form of redistribution of 
wealth and reduction of poverty maximized, then the use of income tax and economic 
transfers can be justified. That the municipality requires individuals to have tried elsewhere, 
before they can get social help, may give these individuals an incentive to exert some effort in 
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order to get out of poverty. This is however not an obvious or automatic consequence of the 
expectations of the municipality. 
6.2 Work requirement 
The dynamics of individuals’ decision-making schemes makes it necessary, not only to study 
the spread of the use of social assistance among individuals, but also how long it lasts. Work 
requirement in Norway is mainly focussed at getting individuals out of unemployment in the 
long-run. One of its main targets has been individuals with foreign background, who statistics 
show, receive social assistance more frequently than the Norwegian population in general. 
The figures are higher for newly arrived foreigners especially those with non-western 
background. 55% of those who receive social assistance are non-western foreigners. 
Whereas it is generally more difficult for newly arrived foreigners to be integrated into the 
Norwegian labour market than the locals, (which makes it more difficult for the individuals to 
be economically self reliant), the integration period, and difficulty level of the non western 
foreigners, vary from group to group. This is mainly because of difference in educational 
background. This leads to, as studies show, fewer labourers and more unemployment among 
foreigners, which has made these individuals more reliant on social assistance. 
Studies also show that individuals with foreign background depend on social welfare for 
longer periods than the rest of the Norwegian population. This is contrary to the goal of the 
social welfare. A report from statistics Norway shows that among foreigners who had been in 
Norway for 5 years, 13 percent of them received social assistance in 1993. This is three times 
higher than the number for the locals. There is also a clear divide between different groups of 
foreigners, with the clearest divide being between refuges, where among 30% receive social 
assistance and non-refuges, where among 7% do. Such divides can be further seen between 
foreigners with western background and those with non-western background, and further 
between groups from different countries. This implies that different measures should be taken 
to address the situations of the different groups or even individuals. I will, however, not go 
into details about the various groups. In the literature we read that lack of relevant 
qualifications is one of the explanations for the low unemployment among foreigners, see 
Djuve and Hagen (1995) and Bratsberg, Raaum, and Røed (2006).  
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In the long run, and because social assistance does not get people out of poverty, there is a 
need for initiatives that will get individuals into the labour market. That the unemployment 
level in Norway is not very high can perhaps imply that these initiatives will not be very 
costly for the government. 
 
There are several forms of work requirement programs which the government and Oslo 
municipality have initiated in order to target the long run dependence on social assistance. 
Individuals who participate here get a transfer which if not enough, can be supplemented by 
social assistance. These programs are so that, some responsibility is laid on the recipients of 
social assistance, and are applied in two ways; introduction programs for newly arrived 
foreigners into the country, and in the form of rehabilitation programs for individuals who 
have fallen from the labour market due to various reasons. 
 
6.2.1 The introduction programme as work requirement 
 
The main objective of the introduction programme is to get newly arrived refuges faster into 
the labour market, or motivate them to take some formal education. This is achieved by giving 
the participants skills in Norwegian language as well as insight into the Norwegian society. In 
a wider scope, the participants also become more able to participate in the society at a level 
equal to the other citizens. Participation in the municipal introduction programs is compulsory 
for the refugees.  
 
Participants get introduction benefits, which I denoted wy in chapter three.  
 
6.2.2 Rehabilitation program (Rehabiliteringspenger) 
 
Rehabilitation programs function in that, individuals receive benefits for subsistence if they 
because of sickness, injury, or disability, cannot continue working. The benefits are temporary 
and are given on condition that the individual is in some form of activity where the goal is 
that he or she goes back to work as soon as possible. The program can run continually for up 
to 52 weeks. If the individual has a job from before, then he must try in cooperation with his 
employer, to create a situation so that the job situation can be maintained. In cases where the 
same job cannot be maintained, or if the individual does not have a job from before, then the 
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local NAV office, will see if the individual can get other kind of assistance such as 
rehabilitation aimed at getting individuals back to work (ykesrettet attføring). 
 
Like in the case of introduction program, those who participate in rehabilitation programs, get 
some benefits similar to the wy in chapter three. The basis for benefits is the income that 
rehabilitation benefits are calculated from, and is calculated from the last income three years, 
before the individual became disabled by over 50% 
 
Individuals with higher expenses because of family size or needs, get supplementary benefits 
so that they can meet these needs.  
 
The advantages of work requirement programs, such as its ability to get individuals out of 
poverty in the long run, has been the government’s objective through the ministry of labour 
and inclusion. Reports from NAV and statistics Norway show that there has been a substantial 
success in the program. 
 
The programs under NAV initially focussed on targeting individuals who did not have the 
necessary qualifications. They failed to target those who had fairly high levels of education, 
but did not have access to the labour market because of their background or lack of skills. 
This has led to an extension of the programs, and more courses are offered to target more 
groups, even academics. 
 
That NAV cooperates with small firms and certain employers, may also create control 
problems in that, the authority cannot control whether the reports they get, about among 
others, the labour input and wage levels are true. 
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6.3 House rent 
In addition to social assistance towards subsistence, households may receive assistance to 
cover housing facilities and electric bills. These transfers are earmarked, and can be looked at 
as in-kind transfers. I have in this thesis focused in the use of house rent allowance. 
According to the rules and guidelines that Oslo municipality uses, in order to get house 
allowance, either the applicant or a member of the family must be a legitimate or deserving 
recipient.  These may include families with children, disabled persons and pensioners. One of 
the requirements of Oslo municipality for those applying for rent allowance is that all 
members of the family must stay in the apartment, thus there is no possibility of renting out 
the apartment or house. 
 
That the apartments must be simple, in order to get house rent allowance, and that such 
apartments are often located in areas that are not very popular to live at, enables the 
municipality to separate those who truly need help and the potential impostors. 
 
In general, however, there is a need to use different instruments to target different groups. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have discussed the use of lump-sum taxes as a benchmark model, which leads 
to optimal redistribution according to the utilitarian goal of a benevolent policy maker, here 
represented by Oslo municipality. The use of lump-sum taxes is based on the assumption that 
the policy maker has full information about the recipients’ types, and their preference over 
different bundles of consumption goods and leisure. Individual types were either determined 
by their income generating ability, reflected by their wage levels, or by their relative utility of 
income, depending on health conditions, size of family or other exogenous factors, that affect 
their consumption of labour income. These types were random characteristics, and determined 
whether an individual got transfers, or was to pay taxes to cover the costs of the transfers. 
 
In an environment of full information, we saw that the use of lump-sum tax and transfers was 
optimal in moving the allocation of resources from one Pareto optimal allocation to another. 
The environment of full information is, however, hypothetical and I extended my discussion 
to cover the real life situation where, the policy makers make their decisions, in an 
environment with asymmetric information. In such an environment, the use of lump-sum 
taxes leads to deadweight loss and there is a need to use other instruments of redistribution to 
reduce this deadweight loss. This can be achieved by targeting the efficiency of the recipients, 
and I have discussed three different ways by which this can be done; namely by the use of 
income taxes and cash transfers, work requirement, and the use of in-kind transfers. These 
instruments target recipient efficiency by creating restrictions on their choices of labour and 
leisure in the cases where poverty is caused by income generating ability. In the cases where 
poverty is caused by relative utility of income, the instruments create restrictions by targeting 
what quantity or quality of goods and services they can receive. I have divided the 
asymmetric environment into two, first when only income is observable, and the second case, 
when the policy maker has no information about the recipients, and discussed the effects of 
the various instruments under different situations.  
 
When poverty is caused by income generating ability, and the policy maker has information 
about the recipients’ incomes, then we have seen that income taxes and cash transfers can be 
used. How high the cash transfers can be is, however, limited and this may limit the use of 
this instrument to redistribute income. Income tax may also have a distorting effect on the 
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labour inputs, and cash transfers when not correctly targeted, may turn to be poverty traps, in 
that individuals who receive social assistance may choose not to work as efficiently as they 
would in the absence of these transfers. These effects may therefore, limit the extent to which 
income tax and cash transfers can be used as an instrument of redistribution. The use of work 
requirement can target certain groups of individuals that income tax may not.  In the long run, 
work requirement has the deterrent effect in that it creates an incentive in individuals to work 
hard to get out of poverty. This is especially true for individuals without required skills as in 
the case of newly arrived foreigners, who may lack language and labour skills. In that way, it 
reduces the number of the poor in the long term. This is an effect that cash transfers do not 
necessarily have. Using work requirement as a deterring instrument does not however 
increase the utility of the participants. This is because it should create an incentive in 
individuals to get out of poverty. Work requirement may also crowd out the private sector 
because it has cheap labour input to offer certain services, but in cases of subsidised income 
for individuals working in the private sector, this negative effect is reduced or disappears. 
When income cannot be observed, then the use of income tax and cash transfers fails, and 
work requirement provides the necessary requirements to both discourage potential impostors 
in the short run, and encourage individuals to work hard to get out of poverty in the long run. 
 
When poverty is, however, caused by relative utility of income, then the use of labour income 
and work requirement may fail to target the correct recipients. The use of in-kind transfers 
may, however, target those who have utilized their income generating ability, but may still be 
poor due to their consumption expenditure because of health costs or family size. The fact that 
in-kind transfers are inferior to cash transfers has a separating effect when this inferiority is 
intended. I have here looked at the use of house rent allowance as in-kind transfers, and 
discussed how low quality houses can be used as inferior in-kind transfers to effectively 
separate the deserving recipients from the potential impostors. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that each instrument, on its own, cannot target all the various 
types in the society, and a good welfare program should therefore, use different instruments at 
different levels, to target different groups. Given a continuous range of individual types, the 
definitions of the intended recipients and potential impostors may vary from individual to 
individual, affecting to what extent the various instruments can be used, and their 
administrative costs on the policy makers. Discussing the distribution of individual types in 
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Oslo municipality and recommending which instruments to be used, is, however, beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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